THE PROVINCE STRIKES BACK
# IMPERIAL DYNAMICS
IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Edited by Björn Forsén and Giovanni Salmeri

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Contents

Preface

This volume is based on the conference *Experience of Empires – Responses from the Provinces* held at the Finnish Institute at Athens in June 2006. The conference was sponsored by the *European Cooperation in the Field of Scientific and Technical Research* (COST) as part of the COST A36 project *Tributary Empires Compared: Romans, Mughals and Ottomans in the Pre-Industrial World from Antiquity till the Transition to Modernity*. This project, which was proposed in 2004 by Peter Bang, University of Copenhagen, supports meetings on the history of pre-modern Empires. The Athenian conference was organised by Björn Forsén and Giovanni Salmeri, the representatives of Finland and Italy in COST A36.

The editors are grateful to all the contributors for their readiness to accept the suggestions made by the anonymous referees. Mark Weir was kind enough to translate Giovanni Salmeri's chapter, while Ian A. Todd read the remaining chapters with a vigilant eye paying careful attention to the use of English. Special thanks are given to Maurice Sartre for his thoughtful report on the contents of the volume which offered most useful material for the introductory chapter. Thanks are also due to Peter Bang, Jeannette Forsén, Maria Martzoukou, Mikko Suha and Esko Tikkala for help in organising the conference and to Vesa Vahtikari and Marjaana Vesterinen for help in preparing this volume. *Est in votis* that it stimulates further comparative research on pre-modern Empires in the Eastern Mediterranean area, where the idea of Empire originated and where Empires took their first steps.

Athens, 30 November 2007

Ideology and Practice of Empire

Björn Forsén and Giovanni Salmeri

Over the last decade the topic of Empire, together with that of democracy, has been a focus of attention for historians and students of politics. Democracy has been considered in particular in its electoral dimension and from the point of view of its bearing on freedom, while studies of Empire have been dictated by the need to define it as a political category. In addition various empires have been analysed in the light of their contribution to overall political stability on one hand, and the processes which led to their dissolution on the other. We shall not here go into the strong bond – which has frequently been pointed out – existing between these enquiries and the world order that has come into being following the demise of the Berlin wall. An event which, together with the Gulf wars, sparked off a process of significant expansion of electoral democracy, with the United States occupying a new, overtly imperial role in world politics.[1]

To begin let us mention the interconnection between democracy and Empire and the phenomenon of globalization, which is increasingly emphasized in both a positive and negative sense. Thus for example the expansion of electoral democracy has been seen also as the outcome of globalization, while democracy *tout court*, in the sense of citizen power within the prevailing political system, is thought to be progressively threatened by globalization. There is a well pondered consideration of this matter, with some incursions into philosophy,[2] in O. Höffe's *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*,[3] where the author gives a comprehensive analysis of the demands which the process of globalization makes on the political organisations of humanity.

Turning to Empire, the contemporary process of globalization has contributed significantly to the genesis of Hardt and Negri's approach in a volume which, leaving aside all the criticism it has attracted, has unquestionably opened up a new vision of the notion of Empire.[4] As for the ancient world, one would perhaps question the relevance of globalization to studies of the nature and functioning of the Roman Empire, a characteristic of various works in recent years in the Anglo-Saxon world.[5] In fact the recent phenomenon of globalization is at the heart of a radical mutation which is economic and financial, certainly, but is above all human. Integration and interconnection have taken on such importance that today one can no longer exist in the local dimension without being aware, above all through media, of belonging to the world's 'globality'. Whereas for the Roman Empire, which cannot be seen as globalized, it would seem more appropriate to adopt, with all due caution, the notion of *mondialisation*, based on fluxes and movements, and which is commonly referred to the last part of the nineteenth century, which saw the beginnings of economic internationalization.[6]

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[1] On this see Münkler 2005 and Hobsbawm 2008, and with a different perspective Mann 2003.

[2] Interest for the philosophical approach seems to be absent in the Anglo-Saxon production on the subject.

[3] Höffe 1999.

[4] Hardt and Negri 2000, see also Negri 2006.

[5] See e.g. Hingley 2005 and Sweetman 2007 (basing her approach on Waters 1995).

[6] See Abélès 2008.

It is interesting to see how the prevailing attitude among scholars and political analysts to democracy and Empire has shifted in recent years. From the Second World War onwards, and in some cases going back to the beginning of last century, democracy – associated with classical Greece – tended to be viewed in a very positive light, while Empire – associated with the experience of Rome – was often the object of reservations and accusations. Whereas today even some scholars of classical Athens, invariably the most passionate advocates of democracy especially in the English speaking world,[7] have begun to take a rather more critical stance. For example, L.J. Samons II in *What's Wrong with Democracy?* seeks to highlight its limits in both the ancient and modern world, focusing in particular on elections as its key episode.[8] And in a book that has provoked considerable discussion, L. Canfora emphasises what is basically the ideological aspect of democracy seeking for centuries to pave the way for the so-called 'power of the masses' while opposed by the élites building up the electoral legitimation of their power.[9] Canfora also unmasks the paradox – both ancient and modern – which allows a state to pursue a hegemonic design while claiming to be the champion of liberty and democracy.[10]

The last few years have seen some works dealing specifically with democracy in the modern world which, in addition to a reinterpretation of the global advancement and retreat of democracy across the centuries proposed by Ch. Tilly,[11] include such critical appraisals as the studies by M. Mann, R.A. Dahl and S. Ringen.[12] To sum up drastically, Mann for example maintains that the ideal of rule by the people can actually transform *demos* into *ethnos*, generating organic forms of nationalism and fostering the cleansing of minorities.[13] Dahl on the other hand looks at the fundamental issue of equality and tries to pin down the reasons why governments have not fulfilled their democratic ideals. While recognising that complete equality is utopian, Dahl argues that the present situation in the United States is disturbing: the unequal accumulation of political resources suggests that the condition of political imbalance will increase until it becomes irreversible. In other words, the overall advantage in terms of power, influence and authority can become so overwhelming that, even if the 'have nots' are in the majority, they are simply incapable, and possibly also reluctant, to make the effort necessary to combat and defeat the forces with a vested interest in inequality.[14]

This critical trend is quite prevalent nowadays in the domain of studies of democracy, while in studies of Empire we see a tendency to acquire a deeper knowledge which somehow supersedes the anti-imperial mentality. Right at the beginning of last century this received a strong impulse from *Imperialism* by J.A. Hobson,[15] and then brought together such radically contrasting figures as V.I. Lenin and R. Reagan.[16] It must be clearly understood, however, that the current demand to gain a deeper knowledge of

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[7] An example is offered by A.H.M. Jones (1904-1970), on whom see Salmeri 2007, 146-148.

[8] Samons 2004.

[9] Canfora 2006.

[10] Canfora 2007, see also Zakaria 2003.

[11] Tilly 2007.

[12] Mann 2005, Dahl 2006, Ringen 2007.

[13] Mann 2005.

[14] Dahl 2006.

[15] Hobson 1902.

[16] See Hart 2008, 1-2, with interesting considerations. Lenin's classic *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* first appeared in Russian (Lenin 1917).

Empire has nothing to do with the ideological adhesion to the Roman Imperial experience on the part of the British ruling class in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.[17] There is more of an analogy for it in the interest which a sixteenth century author such as J. Bodin, in his *Six livres de la République* (1576), took in investigating sovereignty and its basis, or in the reflections which in the same century and the following one J. Lipsius and others pursued concerning Tacitus and Seneca,[18] or again in the conceptual framework of a work like E. Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-1788).

It is significant that both Bodin and Gibbon are points of reference for Hardt and Negri, the authors of the study that epitomises the current trend of research on Empire. While making a clear distinction between the modern concept of Empire and the Roman Empire, they place the latter in the genealogy (*à la* Foucault) of the former. According to Hardt and Negri, we now have an Empire that certainly cannot be compared with the 'territorial' empires of world history, but rather is to be seen as a new form of sovereignty governing a world where transformation of the productive processes has brought in its wake transformation of every aspect of social life. The link that the authors identify between this form of sovereignty and the Roman Empire, over and above such outward characteristics as the permeability of borders and administrative fluidity, lies in the extreme radicalisation of the correspondence between the ethical and juridical perspectives, to the point that the basic principle of both appears to be that of ensuring peace and guaranteeing justice for all peoples with all possible means.[19]

The volume by H. Münkler, *Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten*, pays less attention to the theoretical dimension than do Hardt and Negri. The author adopts a perspective which is in many ways comparative, and elaborates a number of questions concerning Empire: What has characterised imperial sovereignty throughout history? What contribution to stability does an Imperial regime offer, and what are the risks this involves? These are undoubtedly key questions, and Münkler manages to come up with answers which are by no means simplistic.[20] Whereas in her book *Day of Empire,* A. Chua addresses a single question, namely *How hyperpowers rise to global dominance and why they fall.* The author uses "hyperpowers" to mean "globally dominant empires, pluralistic and tolerant" like the Roman Empire. After analysing their histories she tackles the question of whether in future America – which has grown in a little over two centuries from a regional power into a hyperpower – will be able to maintain its position as the world dominant power, or whether it is already in decline.[21]

Right from the title there is no mistaking the historical approach taken in *Empires. Perspectives from Archaeology and History,* edited by S.E. Alcock, T.N. D'Altroy, K.D. Morrison and C.M. Sinopoli. Its papers "explore polities from both the Old and New World and span early prehistoric empires through later historic empires, including the problematic early modern period and the first century of European intercontinental imperial expansion". However it specifically denies any ambition of standing as "the

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[17] On this see Hingley 2000.
[18] See especially Oestreich 1982.
[19] Hardt and Negri 2000, 10.
[20] Münkler 2005.
[21] Chua 2007. See Kennedy 1987, where the term 'Empire' is not used in the title.

big book of empires", seeking instead to break down "some predetermined and arbitrary boundaries, both disciplinary and temporal".[22] In fact the papers are organized in five transverse sections – from 'Empires in a wider world' to 'Imperial integration and imperial subjects' and 'Imperial ideologies' – which constitute a formidable basis for future work on this topic.

Lastly we can recall the volume *L'empire gréco-romain* by P. Veyne.[23] In a masterly synthesis of philosophy and sociology, archaeology and psychology, social history, cultural history and history of mentalities, he puts the variegated world of the Roman Empire on the stage. The strong point of this work is that Veyne does not gloss over the differences within the Empire itself. He makes much of its dual linguistic nature (Greek and Latin), and the considerable autonomy accorded at the level of local administration. While pointing up the multicultural and *mondialisée* dimension of the Roman Empire, he does not fall into the trap of establishing a precise comparison with our world. For him, the study of history means underscoring the differences between past and present, even though he is well aware that the Roman Empire occupies an important place in the genealogy (once again *à la* Foucault) of our globalized world.[24]

The current interest in the notion of Empire and the history of the individual empires is well reflected by the papers brought together in this volume. In general they set out to explore how the people in provincial societies[25] relate and respond to the action of the imperial government. Most of the contributions deal specifically with areas of the Eastern Mediterranean – Anatolia, Crete, Greece – that came under a succession of different empires, and also seek to show how the inhabitants reacted to the change of imperial rule. The final section features papers dealing with more general issues such as 'Empire and collective mentality' and 'Empires and migrational trends', still in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean.

In chronological terms the papers span some two and a half millennia, starting from the Persian Empire and finishing with the last century of the life of the Ottoman Empire. The decision to exclude both from the conference and from this volume treatments of the Hittite, Assyrian or Babylonian empires was motivated by the fact that the issues they raise are not readily compatible with later empires. It can hardly be insignificant that Münkler himself takes Rome as the starting point for his work.[26] And in the case of the Persian Empire, as Vincent Gabrielsen well illustrates in the first chapter of this volume, there are numerous points of contact with the subsequent experiences of Alexander and the Hellenistic kingdoms and hence Rome.

As for the general theme of the volume, the scholarly emphasis on the relation between provinces and central government in ancient empires has during the last two decades come to lay more stress on regional variation inside the empires and on native agency in the development of the provincial responses. The traditional image of empires

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[22] Alcock *et al.* 2001, xvii-xviii.

[23] Veyne 2005.

[24] The sub-title chosen for the Italian translation of Veyne 2005 is *Le radici del mondo globale* (Veyne 2007). On Foucault and his approach to history, see now Veyne 2008.

[25] On the use of the notion of 'province' in the cases of the Persian, Seleucid, Venetian, and Ottoman Empires, see *infra* the chapters by V. Gabrielsen, C. Brélaz, M. Georgopoulou, and S. Faroqhi.

[26] Münkler 2005.

based on the idea that they exploit the periphery, meaning the provinces, has gradually been revised, becoming more lenient to the centre, particularly in the case of the Persian Empire following the work done by P. Briant.[27] Thus before presenting a brief overview of the volume as a whole, it is perhaps appropriate to highlight some general aspects concerning provincial status and provincial responses, mostly using examples connected to the Roman Empire which have parallels elsewhere.

First of all we can consider the distinction between the systems of administration and command within empires outlined by Hardt and Negri in *Empire*, as a way of gaining a better understanding of the forms of relation between centre and provinces. The authors reject the idea that the current world order, alluded to above, arose spontaneously from the interaction of fundamentally diverse global forces. They are also opposed to seeing the new order as being dictated by a single power, or descending from a single, rational centre, capable of over-riding global forces and influencing historical development according to a conscious purpose.[28] Coherently with this perspective, Hardt and Negri consider the systems of command and administration to be two distinct sectors: administration aims at solving specific problems one by one, without following any broad guidelines, the criterion for success being local efficacy; while the objective of command is general control of the multitude through the application of tools such as military power and communications.[29]

A scheme conceived in this way can not simply be applied to the structures of the Roman Empire, or to the dynamics of relations between centre and provinces, but it can certainly help us towards a better understanding of the interaction between central power and provinces in the Roman Empire. Let us take an example, drawn from the recent volume by C. Brélaz, *La sécurité publique en Asie Mineure sous le Principat*.[30] The main focus is on the provinces of Asia Minor, where the presence of the Roman army did not make itself greatly felt, and where the Greek cities showed a highly developed civic organisation and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. With regard to the public security system, moreover, the author brings revealing light to bear on the separate spheres of action respectively of the central authorities and the local communities. The picture he traces corresponds to the vision of Hardt and Negri: the central authorities are seen to have had a hand in the sphere of command, which saw the Roman forces directly involved only when strategic interests were at stake, while the local communities were responsible for administration – the everyday management of law and order – with a fair degree of autonomy.

The distinction between command and administration drawn by Hardt and Negri also proves enlightening when we read the tenth book of Pliny the Younger's *Epistulae*, containing both the letters the author sent to Trajan in his capacity as governor of Bithynia and the emperor's answers. What is particularly striking about these answers is Trajan's deftness and elasticity in addressing administrative problems, two qualities which also appear to characterise the action of his successors and predecessors when faced with comparable situations.[31] Usually this type of behaviour is thought to derive

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[27] Briant 1996.

[28] Hardt and Negri 2000, 3.

[29] Hardt and Negri 2000, 339-348. No reference to Hardt and Negri, and very limited interest in defining administration and command in the papers collected in Haensch and Heinrichs 2007 (*Herrschen und Verwalten [...]*).

[30] Brélaz 2005.

[31] See Salmeri 2005, 188-189.

from the unplanned, contingent nature of the relations between emperor and subjects as hypothesised, for example, by F. Millar.[32] But it could also derive from the conviction, which seems to have been widespread among the members of the Roman ruling class, that the approach to problems of administration, which was concerned with managing separate, segmented social forces, should be different from the one applied in the exercise of command.

There are various other cases where application of Hardt and Negri's distinction between administration and command can be of help in tracing back the origins of the relatively ample scope for manoeuvre characterising the action of the local communities under the Roman Empire. Here however we would stress the fact that Hardt and Negri's distinction suggests some doubt about the conception of Roman provincial administration as something rigid, with sets of precise rules to be applied. Such appears to be the point of view of certain scholars who take a particular interest in the needs of the central powers, like the German authors J. Bleicken, M. Wörrle and W. Eck.[33] Wörrle, for example, in his valuable work *Stadt und Fest*,[34] attributes a – perhaps exaggeratedly – important role to the central authorities in determining the organisation of the festival founded by Julius Demosthenes at Oenoanda in Lycia. Rather more convincing is the position taken by F. Millar, based as it is on pragmatic analysis of the material rather than theoretical assumptions of an *étatiste* type. In particular, in *The Emperor in the Roman World*,[35] Millar places considerable stress on the ample scope for action which the central authorities conceded to the provincial cities and their inhabitants. It is an approach that has greatly influenced the study of political life in the cities of the Empire, and in particular in the provinces of Asia Minor, with increasing attention being given to their capacity for initiative that had already begun to emerge under the rule of the Hellenistic kings.[36]

An excellent example of this state of affairs is offered, once again, by the letters exchanged between Pliny the Younger in his role as governor of Bithynia and the emperor Trajan.[37] A formula we find in these letters runs *suis legibus uti*,[38] referring to the possibility some provincial communities enjoyed of bringing their own legislative tradition to bear in the field of administration. The impression we receive of quite considerable degrees of autonomy for the provincial communities is also confirmed by study of the literary sources and epigraphic material, above all that from the eastern provinces of the Empire and dating mainly from the second century AD.[39]

Another aspect concerning provincial responses we should emphasise is how the Empire changes the life of the people in the provinces, or to put it in another way, how the people of the provinces react to the actions and impositions of imperial government. Life in the areas conquered by the Romans, especially in the West, usually changed in much the same way, with the appearance of such elements of Roman material and social culture as roads, towns, villas, baths, aqueducts and amphitheatres, not to speak of the spread of

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[32] Millar 1992.
[33] Bleicken 1982, Wörrle 1988, Eck 2002.
[34] Wörrle 1988.
[35] Millar 1992.
[36] See Ma 2000, and now Capdetrey 2007.
[37] See Salmeri 2005, 188-189.
[38] Plin. *Ep.* 10.92.
[39] See Veyne 2005, 163-257; Salmeri 2007.

the Latin language, the Roman monetary system etc.[40] Preceded by T. Mommsen's vision of a Romanizing Empire,[41] in the early twentieth century F. Haverfield and C. Jullian[42] described this process as Romanization, and maintained that the Roman administration played an active part in it with the purpose of unifying and centralising the Empire as the newly conquered provinces were civilised. The interpretation of Mommsen, Haverfield and Jullian was clearly influenced by the national and imperial ideologies of their own times,[43] and has recently come in for criticism in several quarters as being over-simplistic, focusing attention on the élite of the Empire, and conceiving of identity and social change in terms that are too crude and concrete. S. Alcock, G. Woolf, D. Mattingly and R. Hingley[44] have argued that we should abandon the term Romanization altogether in order to avoid its inherent Romanocentric bias.

Part of the criticism of Mommsen and Haverfield is connected to the fact that they do not allow any agency for the provincial peoples in the process of spreading Roman material and social culture. Scholars such as P. Brunt and M. Millett,[45] on the other hand, tend to interpret the spread of Roman culture as a result of the native élites in the provinces Romanizing themselves under the influence of Rome. Following the same orientation, G. Woolf's recent approach to 'becoming Roman' makes much of the differences between the various provinces and regions, which led to Roman culture being adapted in different forms. The Roman culture was in a way reinvented over and over again in the context of local needs. Indeed Woolf goes further, stressing the fact that the provinces, especially the Eastern ones, also influenced the culture of the centre, and that the imperial culture that developed somehow supplanted the previous Roman culture of the capital just as it came to replace other earlier cultures of the inhabitants of the provinces.[46]

To end this section it has to be added that much of the study of the provincial responses to imperial government still concentrates on the élite, while the impact of Empire on the lower strata of the population is more difficult to grasp.[47] However, this is such a vast topic that we can certainly not pursue here, although it must be borne constantly in mind in reading the chapters of this volume, which in most cases deal only with the élites.

It is appropriate that this volume on empires in the Eastern Mediterranean opens with a wide-ranging chapter by V. Gabrielsen concerning Asia Minor, embracing several empires and various topics. He tends to highlight the elements of continuity (not merely territorial) without glossing over differences and breaks in his consideration of the empires of the Achaemenids, of Alexander and of the Seleucids, taking the Athenian Empire as a

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[40] A similar process can be detected and followed also in the Ottoman Empire with the spread of mosques, tekkes, hamams, caravanserais, aqueducts, bridges, fountains, domestic architecture etc. See e.g. Kiel 1990.

[41] Mommsen 1885.

[42] Haverfield 1912, Jullian 1920.

[43] Hingley 2005, 16-19, 30-35.

[44] Alcock 1997, Woolf 1998, Mattingly 2002, Hingley 2005.

[45] Brunt 1990, Millet 1990.

[46] Woolf 1994, Woolf 1997, Woolf 1998.

[47] It can be studied through factors such as trade, or presence of military contingents, which came to influence, although indirectly, the life in the provinces, see Bang 2003, 204-205; Bang 2006; Mitchell 1993, 118-142. For the use of pottery as evidence for ancient social history, especially with regard to the lower strata of population, see Roth 2007 (concentrating on the process of 'Romanization' in Central Italy).

countermodel in order to achieve a clearer picture of the features of the former ones. The richness and interest of the subjects Gabrielsen deals with concerning the role and action of the provinces in the empires of Asia Minor, is well symbolised by his identification of a tradition of *Empire-as-integration*, characterising the Persian Empire, and of *Empire-as-disintegration*, applied to the Seleucid Empire, or again his interpretation of revolts as contributing to the consolidation of imperial power. While usually seen as factors of destruction and disintegration, they are presented, with a large number of examples, as "the quasi-ritualized re-enactment of conquest by means of separate acts of re-conquest of imperial components". Surely this interpretation can also be applied to some cases that occurred in the Roman and Ottoman empires.

The second chapter, by C. Brélaz,[48] also focuses on Asia Minor, and offers a neat presentation of the ways in which order was maintained and justice exercised in the Roman provinces of the area. The author pays particular attention to the division of responsibilities in this connection between local autonomy and imperial power, and emphasises – with explicit reference to the distinction between administration and command made by Hardt and Negri – how the cities had a relatively large scope for manoeuvre in everyday matters, while the imperial authorities kept a monopoly over the military and matters of supreme jurisdiction.

Moving on to the Ottoman Empire, in her study of pious foundations from the late fifteenth to the early seventeenth century S. Faroqhi shows how local élites managed to hold on to some of their power in the province of Anadolu. For example, some of the administrators sent by the central government would settle in the provincial towns of Anadolu, their families entering the ranks of the local élite and pouring money into pious foundations. Although the local élite remained at a lower level in the imperial structure, with very few of its members managing to graduate into the upper élite, this investigation is of great importance for our understanding of the relations between central government and provinces in the Ottoman Empire.

The contributions by Brélaz and Faroqhi both reveal the need for empires like the Roman and Ottoman ones to have local intermediaries acting in the provinces. J. Haldon for his part examines in depth the relationship – quite often involving competition – between provincial élites and central authorities in the Byzantine Empire, with a special emphasis on the ninth through the eleventh centuries. The author tries to identify the structural constraints which determined the patterns of evolution of the Byzantine state, that is to say the means through which its social élites maintained control over resources, whether human or material. Conflicts or tensions concerning the distribution of resources both within dominant élites, and between them and other elements in society, are seen as a dynamic element prompting institutional and organisational change, to the advantage of one group or another. Within this perspective, the taxation system appears a fundamental way of appropriating resources by the state or those acting on its behalf.

No less than three contributions take into consideration the provincial status of the island of Crete in three different historical moments. The key question in each case is: what changes? A. Chaniotis shows that, in the case of the Roman Empire, in practice everything changes. He has no hesitation in affirming that, by putting an end to the political fragmentation that had characterised Crete in the previous centuries, the coming of Rome

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[48] See Brélaz 2005.

"was the most significant turning point in the history of the island since the destruction of the Minoan palaces". Once it had been integrated in a unified Mediterranean ambit, Crete saw its social, economic and indeed cultural structures deeply modified without the central power which originated this change ever imposing strong signs of its presence.

The situation of Crete under the Venetian Empire was rather different. In this case it was defined as *colonia* by the ruling power, and M. Georgopoulou offers some interesting notations on the meaning of this term for the island. She goes on to explore the topic of the transfer of cultural and political forms from the mother city to Crete, and in particular of how cultural symbols were able to foster new power relationships when reused in a different context. An excellent example of this is provided by the author through the analysis of the origins and development of the church of St. Mark in Candia/Herakleion, the island's capital city. Entering the Ottoman Empire quite late on, Crete appears to have been ruled according to a model which can be compared perhaps more with the Roman than with the Venetian one. In his chapter A. Anastasopoulos focuses on the island and relations between centre and periphery in the eighteenth century, and in particular on administration and taxation. His reconstruction of the process of formation of the local élite is of great interest, as is the evaluation of the various motives underlying the conversion from Christianity to Islam of part of the island's population following the Turkish conquest.

After these three studies dedicated to Crete, the volume concludes with four more general chapters, of which the one by J. Haldon has already been discussed. In an innovative approach, G. Salmeri sets out to show how a structure like the Roman Empire could produce transformations and innovations in the sphere of the collective mentality. He analyses the development of the notion of *eutaxia* from the fifth century BC to the second century AD. *Eutaxia* went from indicating orderliness on the battlefield, indispensable for obtaining victory, in classical Athens, to signifying obedience and decorum as a female quality in the Roman Imperial age. In addition, in the first half of the second century AD it featured in political debate in the cities of Asia Minor, expressing the need for law and order on the part of local notables. At the root of this transformation the author identifies the change in mentality brought about in the Greek world by the emergence of large centralised states like the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Empire.

The penultimate chapter, by B. Forsén, takes the most comparative approach. It looks in depth at migrational trends in Greece under the Roman and Ottoman empires, illustrating for example parallel situations of demographic increase respectively in the islands of Delos and Hydra. On account of the extent of its territory, the multiple possibilities it offers and its ability to impose its solutions, the imperial structure appears to the author as particularly favourable towards migrations, using them to significantly modify demography in its provinces. He also emphasises how empires from the time of the Assyrians have forced or encouraged people to move with the explicit purpose of consolidating their power over conquered areas.

The final contribution is by I. Arnaoutoglou and focuses on Athens in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and the first of the new Greek national state. In 1813 the Philomousos Society was founded in the city, comprising not only most of the local élite but also a large number of Greeks from elsewhere, Britons and other Europeans. Soundly rooted in the variegated context of Ottoman Athens in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the Society clearly felt the influence of the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment, not least in its task of collecting and conserving antiquities for the better education of Greek

youth. The *Philomousoi* pursued this interest in antiquities even during the Greek war of independence: two years after resuming activities in 1824 they were deeply involved in safeguarding and ensuring new lustre for some of the city's ancient monuments.

In the new Kingdom of Greece it is undoubtedly significant that G. Chr. Gropius, an early and active member of the Philomousos Society, was among the founding members of the Archaeological Society in 1837. A constant attention for the antiquities of Athens, then, was shown by members of the composite local élite in the first four decades of the nineteenth century. As has frequently been the case for the élites in the history of empires, they were able to withstand fundamental political changes, conserving some of their interests and habits. In view of this it comes as no surprise to learn that, prior to its destruction in 1842, the Turkish mosque shown occupying the cella of the Parthenon in James Skene's watercolour reproduced on the front cover, was used for several years for storing antiquities from the Acropolis, the most sacred site in Greece.[49]

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[49] Tsigakou 1995, 54.

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